That the lending channel is alive and well for consumer lending is at first glance a compelling notion given the growth in consumer credit. However, this paper demonstrates with disaggregated monthly and quarterly consumer credit data that the consumer loan-supply effect has diminished over time. Contrary to assumptions motivating the lending channel, households are not constrained in accessing credit from any lender (or in any form) in response to a monetary shock. The findings of this paper have important implications for research on the monetary transmission mechanism beyond the lending channel and for business cycle research in general. 
In preview of the results, ultimately the consumer credit data analyzed in this paper suggest both the statistical (and by extension, the economic) significance of the consumer loan-supply effect is weak; in the least, the effect has weakened over time. While monthly consumer credit data from commercial banks from 1968 through 2006 substantiates previous research on consumer lendingmatching the decline documented by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro (2007)-after 1984 the responses of both nonrevolving and revolving consumer credit is not consistent with the lending channel. Instead, both series increase, similar to the result found by Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro (2007) for commercial lending (in fact, total nonrevolving and revolving consumer credit increase for two years after the monetary shock). Also after 1984, the data does not support the notion that households are forced to rely on credit cards in lieu of access to installment loans, or rely on non-bank sources of credit in lieu of bank credit. The quarterly data help corroborate the inference on the monthly data. Notably, while before 1984 the loan-supply effect is evident for consumer lending from small banks and not large banks (consistent with Kashyap and Stein (2000) ), this effect does not appear after 1984. Instead, small bank consumer lending increases for up to two years after the shock along with a slight increase for large bank consumer lending (consistent with the impulses noted for the monthly data for all banks).
Overall, the results of this paper have implications for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. While combined recent studies on small banks and consumer lending identify a consumer loan-supply effect over the last four decades, this paper notes the statistical significance of this effect has diminished in the last twenty years. Indeed the statistical evidence casts doubt on 3 the economic significance of the consumer lending channel. While the economic significance of the lending channel has long been uncertain (if not very weak, as noted by Perez (1998) , Ashcraft (2006) and others), developments in consumer lending over the last three decades (and the growth of credit card lending, in particular) may suggest to some that the relevance of a consumer loan-supply effect is greater than was considered in the literature only a decade ago. Recent data and empirical studies support a key assumption of the lending channel, that consumers are liquidity-constrained in credit markets, and may have become increasingly constrained over time. 6 The statistical evidence in this paper, however, suggests monetary policy has little real effect on consumers through the lending channel.
In particular, the impulse response functions cited in this paper suggest households are not reliant on one type of lender or type of credit, implying households are not constrained in credit markets, at least not in the aggregate. Instead, the data are consistent with the notion that the expansion of consumer credit markets has alleviated liquidity-constraints for households. If so, households can smooth consumption in the face of policy or economic shocks in general. For monetary policy, this should temper the propagation of monetary shocks, or at least, render less effective efforts by monetary policy to stimulate aggregate demand. The lack of evidence supporting the lending channel for post-1984 data support that possibility.
On two related notes, the analysis on consumer credit data in this paper also calls into question the effectiveness of short run fiscal policy (see Coronado et al. (2005) , and Johnson et al. (2006) , for analysis of recent fiscal stimuli), and speaks to the discussion on the "Great Moderation" of the macroeconomy documented by McConnell and Perez-Quiros (1999) and others. 7 While many are quick to associate the moderation with the steady hand of the Federal Reserve, the developments in consumer credit markets, and the data on consumer credit examined here, suggest structural forces are certainly part of the story. In the least, more liquid consumer credit markets, and the associated lack of a consumer lending channel, imply that accommodative aggregate demand policy has less control over short run conditions. The particulars of these implications are taken up below. The next section outlines first the 4 general findings of lending channel literature and its relevancy for households. The latter half of the section then provides descriptive data on consumer credit that suggest the assumptions of the lending channel no longer fit for households. Thereafter, the empirical analysis is presented in detail.
The Lending Channel and Consumer Credit
In the lending channel of the transmission mechanism, contractionary monetary policy can force constrained commercial banks (constrained on both sides of their balance sheet) to restrict lending independent of the demand for loans (see Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for a detailed survey). For borrowers dependent on commercial banks, contractionary monetary policy restricts their main source of credit and increases the costs of seeking alternative sources (see Kashyap and Stein (1995) , and Gilchrist (1993, 1994 ) for detailed discussions). As such, the most compelling literature on lending effects focuses on the relationship between small banks and small borrowers. Stein (1995, 2000) , and Gilchrist (1993, 1994 ) provide a combination of empirical evidence showing that small commercial banks do contract lending after a negative policy shock (while larger banks do not), and small firms are affected by that contraction (see also Kishan and Opiela (2000) ). The "small" commercial bank assumption is important, since it is assumed the small borrower relies on a special relationship with the small bank for its credit, and finds it difficult to get credit from larger banks, or from non-bank alternatives.
For households, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that consumer loans decline significantly following a monetary policy shock, while Ludvigson (1998) finds evidence of a loan-supply effect through auto loans. With updated data, Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro (2007) find similar results for consumer loans (they find no such lending effect for commercial and industrial loans).
These lending channel studies corroborate the assumptions of the lending channel hypothesis that small, liquidity-constrained borrowers suffer when monetary policy forces banks to contract lending.
Indeed, the support for the importance of liquidity constraints motivating a consumer loan-supply effect is well-documented in the consumption literature. As mentioned above, recently, Gross and the latter of which is more supportive of a loan-supply effect for firms).
However, as compelling as the imagery of the liquidity-constrained household may be in invigorating lending channel enthusiasts, the lending channel through consumer lending may have diminished over time. Various strands of economic research suggest that factors such as deregulation, commercial bank consolidation, and other aspects of structural change in financial markets have increased consumer lending to all households (see Athreya (2002) ). One implication is that consumer lending from commercial banks has increased overall and is now predominately the province of large, national banks. Credit card lending, for example, requires the economies of scale best handled by a large organization (Peek and Rosengren (1998) ). In the least, a glance at consumer credit data suggest the motivating assumptions behind the lending channel do not hold.
Some descriptive consumer credit data
First, consumer credit data suggest households are not dependent on small commercial banks as the lending channel tradition assumes (or perhaps never were to the extent assumed), nor do households want for non-bank sources of credit (see Peek and Rosengren (1998) for discussion on the first point). With respect to the former, the top five percent of all commercial banks (in total assets) are now primarily responsible for consumer lending, especially credit card lending. By the end of 2002, banks above the 95th percentile in total assets accounted for 90 percent of consumer lending from commercial banks, and 97 percent of credit card lending. Twenty years prior, the same group of banks accounted for approximately 60 percent and 93 percent, respectively (with 6 the latter category growing from approximately 23 billion dollars to 300 billion dollars). 8 Moreover, from all lenders, revolving consumer credit (credit card lending) has increased from 25 billion dollars in 1971 to 770 billion dollars by the end of 2006. 9 That represents an increase in the revolving component as a share of total consumer credit of 5 percent to 36 percent, respectively. Figure 1 displays these increases relative to installment bank loans (for total banks, and for large and small banks) along with comparative series for non-bank installment and revolving loans. 10 The increase in credit card lending is dominated by banks, while non-banks have increased their share of installment loans relative to banks. 11 One will also note the decline in installment lending by small banks and the relative increases of both loan categories for large banks. 12 
Figure 1
The growth of credit card lending, in particular, suggests the lending channel may be weaker.
Unlike installment consumer loans, a credit card holder has the option of using the unused portion of their credit card line immediately. This liquidity option is not fixed but may increase even as balances increase. As discussed by Gross and Souleles (2002) extensions of credit card limits are typically based on duration since the card was issued, increasing at predetermined intervals or set by other institutional rules. Hence, credit card liquidity may remain well after a negative income shock has occurred (even if the bank eventually curtails its offers of additional cards or lowers existing limits). Therefore, even in the face of tighter monetary policy, credit cards offer households immediate liquidity in the current period and potential liquidity in future periods. This implies that even in the face of tighter monetary policy, households may be able to access the loan before lenders can or will lower the limit. In other words, the constraint only binds once the available liquidity is exhausted. In the lending channel, this would occur if lenders lower the limit to the level of the existing balances, which may or may not occur immediately or at all. This would depend on the lenders likelihood of lowering the limit in the aggregate and to a level where the constraint binds. 13 Indeed, the amount of available liquidity on credit cards dwarfs the level of balances-as measured on and off bank balance sheets. 14 Based on the smattering of descriptive evidence discussed thus far, it would seem that in the aggregate households are not liquidity-constrained. 15 In other words, the consumer credit data suggest that the lending channel for consumers may have been affected by the expansion of consumer lending. With this in mind, in the next section, I document the consumer lending channel using VAR techniques.
Testing for the Consumer Lending Channel
To consider the consumer credit data more formally, I search for evidence of the loan-supply effect by comparing disaggregated bank and non-bank loan data, at both the monthly and quarterly frequency (though the non-bank data are only at the monthly frequency). This follows the general strategies of Gilchrist (1993, 1994) , Stein (1995, 2000) , Ashcraft (2006) , and Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro (2007). I examine disaggregated consumer credit across bank and non-bank sources, and across the nonrevolving and revolving components of each, and for small and large banks (by assets). In addition, I then compare and contrast the behavior of the disaggregated components across time. Comparing disaggregated loan categories tests the lending channel in the following ways:
1. Ceteris paribus, if a bank contracts its supply of installment loans, the revolving component may still increase as consumers rely on those loans to offset the traditional lending channel effect. In this way, the lending channel may have real effects as households typically pay more for revolving credit than installment credit.
2. Ceteris paribus, if a bank contracts its supply of either nonrevolving or revolving loans, nonbank loans may increase. This, too, suggests an increase in costs for households which may affect real spending.
3. If non-bank sources of credit are more wide-spread than in the past, or households simply are not dependent on small banks as suggested in section 2, then the lending channel may have less economic (and statistical) significance than in the past.
The VAR and Sample Selection
I estimate a VAR that includes monthly real consumption expenditures, real nonrevolving consumer credit, real revolving consumer credit, the personal consumption expenditure deflator, and the federal funds rate. 16 Real consumption and the consumer loan components are in log-levels (multiplied Given the nature of the monthly consumer credit data, the estimated VAR must be modified by sample (note the quarterly data alluded to earlier, which allows for the bank size comparison, will be discussed later). Hence the samples are selected as follows: variance-covariance matrix estimated for the impulse response coefficients. These bands define the region forβ i , given the priorβ j 's. 21 In the interest of brevity I refer the reader to Jordà (2005) and Jordà (2007) for details of the local projection method.
The figures that follow display the impulse response functions calculated from the linear pro-11 jection method along with the unconditional standard error bands, and the conditional standard error bands, referred to from here on in as the conditional confidence bands. The impulse response functions calculated from the linear projections prove to match closely those calculated from the standard VAR, hence, the discussion of the results focuses on the former. 22 the responses for nonrevolving non-bank credit and revolving non-bank credit. Contrary to bank nonrevolving credit over this period, the nonrevolving component declines immediately and reaches a trough three years after the shock. However, similar to bank revolving credit, non-bank revolving credit increases, and is statistically significant for up to approximately 18 to 20 months. 25 Figure 4 also displays the two sources of credit aggregated, along with total consumer credit (which includes all possible sources including credit unions, for example). The response of the combined bank and nonbank data is essentially zero of up to two years, while the total series responds similarly.
Results for monthly consumer credit
Ultimately, the behavior of either series does not support the lending channel after 1983; there does not appear to occur a substitution into non-bank finance. 26 This is based on the simple conjecture that one can identify and infer a loan-supply effect with narrative evidence on the institutional rules governing credit card limits. As discussed briefly in section 2, Gross and Souleles (2002) find that limit changes are predominately based on institutional rules and only a small portion of limit changes are from borrower request (and the latter is typically associated with a request for an increase in the limit). In other words, any decline in the response of the unused portions to a contractionary monetary policy shock likely represents a supply-side effect. Of course, one cannot completely rule out the possibility that borrowers request the decline to avoid temptation or for some other reason. 27 However, the narrative evidence suggests that assuming limit changes are predominately at the behest of the lender is a reasonable structural assumption. That is, this posits that the unused portion series is not affected by a change in the level of balances in the current period (in other words, in a VAR, the unused portions are ordered ahead of the balances). Figure 3 for the same post-1984 sample. The quarterly functions are more muted, though both loan components show a similar pattern-an anemic to zero response for approximately two years after the shock followed by a decline (while the for the monthly impulse response functions both loan components increase for about two years, then decline thereafter).
Quarterly Consumer Lending and Credit Card Liquidity
At least by the metric of judging the lending channel by comparing the consumer loan components, the quarterly does not dispel the general finding from the monthly data that after 1984 the loan-supply effect is weak or not evident. Figure 5 . The function for nonrevolving loans shows a small negative response in this case but is not statistically different from zero for most of the horizon. The function for credit card loans is similar to its counter part in Figure 5 , though with the negative decline beginning earlier in Figure 7 .
Given the responses for both credit card balances and for nonrevolving consumer loans, there does not appear to be a substitution into credit card loans. And relative to the data on the unused portions, the decline in credit card balances does is not matched by a reduction in the supply of credit. Hence, on balance the quarterly data set provides corroborative evidence with respect to the inference drawn from section 3.
Why we see an increase in the unused portions in response to an increase in the Federal funds rate is uncertain. The response may reflect that the limit remains relatively unchanged while the balances decline. In Figure 6 , this would only make sense, however, later in the horizon when balances actually decline. One explanation may be that this aggregate response reflects lenders shifting their credit card portfolios towards more credit-worthy borrowers while contracting the limits or accounts of more marginal borrowers. This may lead to a net increase in unused portions even as borrowers increase the demand for balances (if, for example, more qualified card holders receive larger increases in their limits, ceteris paribus, than the decline in the limit for the marginal borrower). 29 This is merely conjecture at this point, but such a distributional effect at the level of the limit among credit card holders may be an interesting area for additional research to consider.
Quarterly Consumer Lending and Bank Size
While the unused portions data offer a new perspective on the lending channel, the quarterly Call Report data are exploited to examine the lending channel hypothesis that the loan-supply effect should be more evident for small banks (as noted in Section 2). Large bank lending should be less-affected by a policy shock that small lenders (where large banking institutions are able to insulate their balance sheets from a policy shock-see Kashyap and Stein (2000) for discussion).
We consider that hypothesis here in the context of consumer lending. Overall, while the loan-supply effect for small bank lending appears evident in the overall sample (and the early sample), this effect is not evident in the latter part of the sample. Moreover, the general implications from the data for small bank and large bank lending are consistent with the monthly data and other quarterly analysis discussed earlier in the paper.
Conclusion
Though the lending channel has proved to be an interesting area of research, the findings of this paper suggest that consumer lending data is no longer consistent with a loan-supply effect. At first glance households and consumer lending seem to fit well with the assumptions driving the lending channel, especially when a long-term perspective is considered. Given the growth of consumer credit over the last two decades, the economic significance of the channel may be greater than in the past. Upon closer inspection, however, disaggregated consumer credit data across bank size, across revolving and nonrevolving consumer loans, across bank and non-bank lenders, and 16 Again, the data on consumer credit is from the Federal Reserve Board's G.19 release, which includes disaggregated data across bank and non-bank sources. Data on consumption and the deflator are available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis while the series for the federal funds rate is available from the Federal Reserve Board. 17 It is common practice to include a price index for commodities in the VAR. Doing so had been found to solve the "price puzzle" common to this analysis-the increase in the regular price index following an increase in the federal funds rate. However, similar to Den Haan et al. 19 I also compared the results considering different break dates (for example, beginning with Greenspan's tenure) and across decades. The qualitative results did not change by any degree of note. Hence, here I only report the results with the break separating the broad periods. 20 Note that the results discussed in this section are robust if real disposable income is used in place of consumption (as in Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro (2007)) or nonfarm payroll employment is included. Note, too, the results are robust to using a block recursive structure. The results are also robust to the inclusion of a time trend, to additional lag lengths (2, 6, 8 and 12 lags were also considered) and to ordering the federal funds rate ahead of the other variables. These variations did not change the impulse response functions to a notable degree so are not reported here. The interested reader can see the author's website for figures displaying the impulse response functions calculated under these alternative specifications. 21 Jordà (2007) also provides a joint test of the impulse response function coefficients, and a test of the cumulative significance of the coefficients. These additional metrics did not add much to the inference in this paper, nor facilitate the comparison of the results to previous lending channel research. A previous version of this paper includes these metrics and can be found on the author's website. 22 However, for thorough comparison, the impulse response functions calculated from the VAR can be found on the 24 One will also note the weak response of consumption in Figure 3b . One possibility for the difference in results before and after 1983 is a difference in the size of the shock. However, the inference is not changed if an identical one percent shock of the federal funds rate is applied to each sample period. Results with the one percent shock can be found on the author's website. 25 The results are similar if bank and non-bank loan components are estimated jointly in a seven-variable specification (see Figure 5 in the working paper version on the author's website). 26 While the data are not consistent with the traditional lending channel assumptions, the decline in nonbank nonrevovling credit (while commercial bank lending is positive) raises questions on the evolution of the monetary transmission mechanism. How a policy shock affects non-bank lenders relative to bank lenders may be an interesting area of further inquiry, which we leave for further research. 27 For example, borrowers might seek a lower limit out of preference for a stable ratio between balances and the limit. Evidence of this sort of preference has been documented by Gross and Souleles (2002) and Castranova and Hagstrom (2004) . 28 The corrected-AIC chose lag lengths of two for the estimation reported here. The results are robust to a lag lengths of one and generally a length of three, though at higher lag lengths the degrees of freedom with the quarterly data (on the shorter samples) becomes an issue. The results are also robust to including real GDP instead of consumption. 29 That may be the case since the institutional rules governing limit extentions certainly favor long-term card holders with a good credit history and so forth (see Gross and Souleles (2002) ). 30 The Call Report data is available on the FDIC's "Statistics on Depository Institutions" website by quarter back to 2001. All other quarters back to the fourth quarter of 1972 are availalbe in .csv format by request from the FDIC.
31 Given the sample sizes with the quarterly data, we estimate for each bank class separately (as displayed in Figure   8 ). If we include all four loan categories together in one specification, the results are less-supportive of the lending channel for the 1972 to 2007 and pre-1984 samples (though the estimation suffers from less degrees of freedom with seven varariables in the specification). Nonrevovling (Installment) Consumer Loans Credit Card Loans Federal Funds Rate Credit Card Loans Nonrevovling (Installment) Consumer Loans Credit Card Loans Federal Funds Rate 
